Most of the coverage before, during and after the report’s publication in Munich last week has been on whether Diack’s successor Sebastian Coe was aware of what was going on. Yet with Coe having retained the support of Commission chair Richard Pound as well as the wider athletics and sporting community, and with no even semi-plausible alternative having emerged, it now seems more important to focus on how and why things went so disastrously wrong.

What particularly interests me is whether the “systemic failures” within the IAAF were unique? Or were they an extreme example of a malaise prevalent across the entire running of international sport?

Pound’s response when asked if he believed in Coe is revealing: “I think you’ve got to understand the concentration of power in and around the President of any international Federation, and the relative infrequence with which something like the IAAF Council would meet and the level of information that would be conveyed from those at the top to the Council," said the 73-year-old Olympic Movement veteran.

“Particularly if it happened to deal with problems.”

In short, he is claiming that throughout sport the power of the President reigns supreme, with the Council powerless to react.

Similar sentiments were offered by Pound’s compatriot Tricia Smith, the President of the Canadian Olympic Committee.

“There was a lack of clarity around the role and authority of the Board versus the role and authority of the former President,” she said. "This enabled the President to exercise significant control, resulting in a culture where people did not have confidence in their ability to act in a way that could affect change.”

It is easy to see how this culture led to the actions of someone like Nick Davies, the veteran and previously well-respected IAAF deputy general secretary, who appears to have joined the web of deceit rather than stand-up against it, although he denies any involvement in criminal corruption.

Having observed how Presidents of many sports bodies act, this all does not come as much of a surprise. Indeed, Smith was not even talking about Diack and the IAAF, but about her own predecessor Marcel Aubut, who resigned in October after at least three allegations of sexual harassment were made against him.

Both Pound and Smith highlighted the absence of an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of the President, as would happen in most business or political systems. In the IAAF, for example, although the constitutional responsibilities of the President involved "updating" and "consulting with" members of the Council, this is only required on a “periodic” basis. In reality, Diack operated unchallenged and the Council were too unaware, too unmotivated and too powerless to scrutinise.

There are certainly some sports bodies where better practices are the norm, but too often Council or General Assembly meetings in sport resemble a chorus of “Yes Men” battling to best show their support for the all-powerful ruler. Most decisions have already been taken behind closed doors by the President and their - usually his - closest advisors. Others know that their best chance of influence comes from gaining their leader’s trust, so displaying loyalty becomes a priority over and above the best interests of the organisation.

Like with Diack or Aubut, the President could essentially get away with anything because no-one is willing or able to stop them, and in extreme cases this is accompanied by a cult of personality to show how the leader is humbly acting in the best interests of humanity and global sport. The truth in Diack’s case was anything but.

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” said 19th century political commentator Lord Acton, and this is what happened at the IAAF.

There are some International Federations (IF) where the structure is different, of course, and the leader is far less autocratic, operating in conjunction with an effective chief executive or secretary general. While current International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach is one such strong ruler, as was Juan Antonio Samaranch in the 1980s and 1990s, Jacques Rogge, the man who came in between, was much more of a consensus leader. In many ways, and particularly in latter years, he was less effective because of it.

But it is interesting to compare the power of the sporting President with the heads of other bodies. In business, the best parallel appears to be with the heads of major business conglomerates in a country like South Korea, where one person - acting both as chairman and chief executive - invariably exercises complete control, with virtually no scrutiny or means to curtail their political or personal power.

There are large companies in the Western world which operate similarly, but on the whole they are subject to far tighter controls. There will be a better balance of power between a chairman and chief executive, while the ruling Board as well as other external regulators will keep both figures on a tighter leash.

The crucial difference is the general absence of a President, a single dominant figurehead at the centre of all public and private messages. In businesses, additionally, if you don’t perform, you go, whereas in sport Pat McQuaid’s 2013 defeat to Brian Cookson in the race for the International Cycling Union Presidency is the only time a sitting summer IF President has been elected out of office in generations.

In politics, the key difference is that there are far more stakeholders who can effectively influence the balance of power: from cabinets, parliaments and opposition parties to pressure groups, the media and voting public. In Britain, we have occasionally had Prime Ministers with strong majorities who have managed to dominate all of these vehicles, such as Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and Tony Blair for a brief period in the late 1990s, but this is unsustainable and contentious economic and foreign policy decisions, in conjunction with powerful rivals within their cabinets, soon ended this hegemony.

In most other European systems, a proportional representation voting method creates a coalition Government which prevents one party or one leader from wielding complete power. In America, the gridlock created by the existence of an equally powerful House of Representatives and Senate, plus powerful lobbying groups, makes it even harder for the President, as we have seen by Barack Obama being unable to introduce key pieces of legislation despite serving eight years in office.

It is only in places like Russia, parts of Africa and other ex-Soviet countries where one dominant President is able to exercise complete control. Some of the countries where sport is gravitating, like in the Gulf as well as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Belarus, sees the President of the country also head up the respective National Olympic Committee.

“I will say something crazy,” said former FIFA secretary general Jérôme Valcke when comparing Brazil 2014 and Russia 2018. “Less democracy is sometimes better for organising a World Cup.”

There is clearly huge admiration for someone like Vladimir Putin in sport, who is not privy to the same checks and balances as a Western leader. Top administrators battle to be most friendly towards him, and for some, his autocratic and gangster-state leadership style provides a template for their organisations.

An interesting counter-point, however, concerns FIFA and its soon-to-depart suspended President, Sepp Blatter. Despite his longevity, Blatter was not really a strong President. He was unable to dominate his Executive Committee and continental Federations and, don’t forget, his preferred choice as 2022 World Cup host was the United States rather than Qatar. To retain support from the 209 member Federations in successive Presidential elections, Blatter therefore had to tolerate the actions of individuals like Jack Warner, who controlled such a large bloc of votes so was too powerful to oppose.

In this case, perversely, a stronger President and a more centralised structure may have meant less problems (although a preference for reform over re-election from Blatter would have helped as well). But this could also create problems for Coe, who, if he is to have a chance of being re-elected as President in 2019, will have to balance his reforms with measures to retain support from the 214 IAAF member Federations.

This is less of an issue in the IOC where the members are mostly appointed by the leadership themselves, something Bach is expected to take advantage of by appointing many allies this summer.

In the case of Coe, you do feel that a strong President is necessary, so long as he has the right intentions. Someone is required to take the sport by the scruff of the neck and usher it into a new age. You hope, however, that he will soon appoint an effective secretary general and that the Council will also become a more effective scrutiniser and brake on Presidential dominance.

And that other sporting bodies will gradually change their culture as well; because many more scandals lie ahead if they don’t.