Based on discussions with experts, the first thing to say is that a distinction should be drawn between stadium-based events and those, like the Boston Marathon, which cover a much larger geographic area.

The second thing to be said is that, unfortunately, when it comes to marathons and the like, the consensus seems to be that 100 per cent security is simply not possible.


According to Helmut Spahn, executive director of the International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS): "The same security concept cannot be applied to all sporting events.

"You have stadiums, indoor arenas and, in this case, a marathon. It is an event with thousands of athletes and spectators, in a city centre with no security perimeters and no access control - an open event without doors.

"To be 100 per cent secure is impossible; but considering the thousands of similar events worldwide each year, incidents at marathons, or other comparable events, are extremely rare."

Khoo Boon Hui, former President of Interpol - who emphasised that he was speaking to me in a personal capacity - expressed a similar view.

"It is very difficult to protect a marathon," he said. "My opinion is that, once someone is very determined, it is very difficult to stop such things happening."


Because of this, when thinking about marathons, part of the focus needs to be on matters, such as education and integration, that have nothing directly to do with race security.

"You have to make sure people don't get radicalised," Khoo told me.

Another prime focus needs to be on making sure that the consequences of an attack can be dealt with as effectively as possible.

Here, certain details that have come to be regular features of mass participation marathons can be helpful.

Perhaps most obviously, fairly extensive medical deployments tend to be on hand near the finish-line to deal with exhausted, injured and dehydrated runners.

Khoo thinks that information gleaned from identity chips worn by runners to help track their progress might also have been used by authorities in the aftermath of the Boston outrage.

"I suspect that was used by investigative agencies to try to find out who exactly was in the vicinity where the explosion took place," he said, meaning not just the runners themselves, but any friends or relatives who might have been watching them, or taking photographs.


Khoo was impressed by how effectively Boston responded to the attacks.

"What impressed me was that they were able to catch [the suspects] so quickly," he said.

This suggested that coordination between police forces must have been good.

"You have to have good structures in place; it is not just about capabilities."

The United States, Khoo said, had "learnt a very big lesson after 9/11".

Juliette Kayyem, a Boston Globe columnist and former assistant secretary at the Department of Homeland Security who was on the scene of the attack less than an hour after it happened, said that the immediate decision to move runners off the finishing stretch on Boylston Street and to focus on family reunification was "key".

This was because "it meant that people who didn't need to be there were evacuated quickly".

Kayyem also told me that the public "reacted positively and responsibly to the early release of images of the suspects, and to requests for them to stay off the streets".

Khoo was struck too by the early release of these images, suggesting that whether or not to go public in this way could be a dilemma for authorities in such situations because it might prompt suspects to go into hiding.

In the age of social media, does it make more sense to get this sort of information out there quickly?

It will be interesting to see if others follow Boston's lead.

For Hugh Brasher, race director of the London Marathon, the long-term effects on sports events held outside a stadium as a result of the Boston Marathon bombing are yet to be ascertained.

"London and its population are used to living with a threat of terrorist activity," he told me in a statement, "and that threat remains at the same level as it was prior to the Boston tragedy.

"The Metropolitan Police have shown, through the 2012 London Olympics and the numerous other events that have taken place since, their skill and proficiency at keeping London safe.

"We will continue to work closely with them, the London Boroughs and other agencies in our event security planning, but will not comment on specific security arrangements, since it undermines their very nature."


The impossibility of ensuring 100 per cent security at events such as marathons is unlikely to mean, however, that nothing will change as a result of the attack on Boston.

For Kayyem, "What marathon planners might learn from the way stadium event planners have handled things is that there probably are ways to better fortify the finish-line than has been done in the past.

"Options here might include enforcing a no-bag policy, or insisting on see-through bags, for spectators; introducing a pre-registration or ticketing system for finish-line spectators; and asking such spectators to pass through x-ray machines.

"Conversely, some US stadium event planners have been so focused on prevention that they have realised post-Boston that they probably don't have as sophisticated a response plan in the event of an incident happening as the top marathon races."

Another obvious area for possible reassessment is the handling of the bags of surplus clothes runners discard at the start of a marathon, leaving them to be transported to the finish-line for them to be reclaimed.

According to Khoo, "This is one of the big problems in planning security of an event like this because you have all those backpacks."

One possible solution, he suggests, would be "a secure facility where everyone deposits bags after being searched".

In considering all of this, event organisers will probably be mindful that, as critical as good security is, they must if at all possible avoid a) jacking up competitors' fees to uncomfortable levels and b) undermining the sporting spirit that their events exist to celebrate in the first place.

This is certainly a dimension of the sports security conundrum that is accepted by the experts I consulted.

"I think on balance sport doesn't want intrusive measures," said Khoo, adding: "What are sporting events for if not for spectators?"

Kayyem makes a similar point no less eloquently:

"Marathons are different beasts because there are no entry and exit doors," she said.

"For these events to be attractive, there is going to be a certain amount of porousness.

"We need to accept that it is a mark of success that such attacks have been so limited and so infrequent."

And what of this broader issue of how more effectively to control the costs and uncertainties associated with protecting high-profile sporting events in general?


Here the ICSS's Spahn provides much food for thought.

"Budgeting for security whilst bidding for major events is a very complex and difficult process," he told me.

"As we have seen recently with events like the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil and the London 2012 Olympic Games, security budgets can sometimes change dramatically from what was proposed when the event was originally being bid for.

"Firstly, I would advise that when planning a security budget whilst bidding for a major event, it is important to coordinate closely with local stakeholders, whilst also drawing upon advice from security experts with previous major event experience across a range of sports and fields.

"This sharing of knowledge is something that is quite rare amongst major event organisers and bid committees, and is something the ICSS actively encourages at events like the 2013 ICSS Security Expert Summit [that took place last week in Vienna].

"From my previous experience, events outside of your control can also have a significant effect on your security budget in the lead-up to [an event].

"As an example, the September 11 attacks had a significant effect on security budgeting for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, which were estimated to have risen to approximately $500 million (£330 million/€389 million), nearly five times the cost of security for the much larger Summer Games hosted six years earlier in Atlanta.

"Some emerging solutions in the security industry that could also be applied in future which will hopefully reduce rising security costs could include: the development of technology that reduces the need to train and employ huge security forces; incorporating a diverse committee of security experts in the early stages of planning a security budget for a major event bid; and developing venues and stadiums that include modular hubs and/or facilities that can be quickly adapted to a developing trend or threat as the event approaches."

David Owen worked for 20 years for the Financial Times in the United States, Canada, France and the UK. He ended his FT career as sports editor after the 2006 World Cup and is now freelancing, including covering the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 World Cup and London 2012. To follow him on Twitter click here.